Epistemology

1 below- F Remedios, Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller`s Social Epistemology. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 2 below- Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 2 (1967) EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 below- Jurgen Habermas Stanford Encyclopedia 4 below- Christian List: 2016, Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontologicalChristian List∗LSEMarch-April 2016 Retjo Wilenlus 1- F Remedios, Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller`s Social Epistemology. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. "Because Fuller’s and Goldman’s social epistemologies differ from each other in many respects, it is difficult to compare the two.[1] The points of difference concern the goals, the conceptions of knowledge, and the scope of study for each of them. The goal of Fuller’s social epistemology is to democratize cognitive authority in terms of science policy and install a constitution of science: How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under normal circumstances knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each working on a more or less well-defined body of knowledge and each equipped with roughly the same imperfect cognitive capacities, albeit with varying degrees of access to one another’s activities (Fuller 1988, 3)? The goal of Goldman’s social epistemology is to evaluate social practices in terms of whether they promote or impede epistemically valuable states, such as knowledge. Fuller’s conception of knowledge is in terms of products of normatively appropriate institutions of inquiry, while Goldman’s conception of knowledge is based on the acquisition of true belief, which is what he calls W-knowledge, or knowledge in a weak sense. S-knowledge, or knowledge in the strong sense, consists of true belief, plus some additional element or elements (Goldman 1999, 23). The scope of study of Fuller’s social epistemology is science, while the scope of study of Goldman’s social epistemology is all forms of social interaction that produce knowledge." https://social-epistemology.com/2013/07/12/orienting-social-epistemology-francis-remedios/ 2) Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 2 (1967) EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Retjo Wilenlus Side 26 University of Helsinki Political scientists have long been in a special position among the social scientists in having continuous conflicts and diverging opinions about the basis of their science, despite the surge and predominance of the "positivist" behavioral approach. This is due to the fact that political phenomena (e.g. those concerning democracy) necessarily also have philosophical aspects that steer the discussion to the basic issues of their science. This discussion, however, is too often isolated from the more general epistemological problems of the social sciences.1 Perhaps the social scientist may feel uneasy when the discussion turns to the epistemological foundations of his science. "A serious economist hardly likes to be caught at the trivial occupation of discussing foundations," says I.M.D. Little. (1957, p. 4) Yet, at the present stage of the social sciences this kind of discussion seems relevant especially from the point of view of the methodology of these sciences. The aim of this paper is 1o show that the presentday discussion about the methodology of the social sciences implies two different ideas of what amounts to a "social phenomenon" and what it is to "explain" or "understand" social phenomena. These two ideas, in turn, are part of two different conceptions of epistemology and philosophy in general. An excellent introduction to what we mean by the epistemological problems in social sciences is Peter Winch's monograph, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1965). The present paper is largely based on Winch's analysis of the basic ideas upon which the study of society is founded. Use is also made of Charles Taylor's, The Explanation of Behavior (1964), which contains a sharp criticism of the conceptual framework of the 'behaviourist' methodology as well as an analysis of the nature of teleological explanation. A third important work from the present point of view is G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention (1958), a study on the concept of intention, a concept that has been much discussed lately. An interesting historical background has been added to this discussion by the revived interest in Aristotle and Hegel. ....Winch does not seem to be aware that his thesis is a newly formulated Aristotelian (and Hegelian) theory about the relationship of knowledge and action. Aristotle's theory can be simplified by saying that the occasion (or cause) for an agent's action is the knowledge he has of the end the action, or that the action or resul: of the action expresses this knowledge. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle presents the following example: "The master builder has the idea of a house in his soul; he knows 'what being a house is'. In a way the house is born of the conception of the house; something immaterial gives occasion to something material." (VII, 7, 1032b 14) In medieval philosophy, Thomas Aquinas represents; essentially the same idea of the relationship between knowledge and action,' while in modern times we meet this idea in Hegelian psychology.10 To be sure, what Aristotle presents relatively clearly, later thinkers generally present more obscurely and in a way evasively. (Thus e.g. Winch speaks of 'the force of the concept of reality'.) Winch's conception of the relationship between knowledge and action differs from Aristotle's, for example, in that he speaks principally of knowledge in terms of reality (also later about knowledge in terms of norms), while Aristotle speaks of knowledge in terms of purposes.11 For some reason Winch seems to avoid the concepts of end and purpose. In a way Winch's thesis is amended by the earlier mentioned Anscombe study, 'Intention', which gives to the concept of intention the importance that belongs to it in the field of human behavior. But, Anscombe seems to be satisfied with rather ambiguous Side 31 expressions in explaining the relationship between intention-knowledge and behavior. Winch's view of the relationship between knowledge and behavior is clearly a part of his epistemology. If we are of the opinion that "the world is for us, what is presented through our concepts", then we will also be inclined to think that our ideas and concepts are une quantité non-négligeable of our behavior, that our behavior in some sense is an expression or a realization of our ideas about reality. Therefore, the explanation of behavior must include those ideas, which the agent (Winch's use of the term) 'exercises' in his behaviour." Although Winch is not aware of the historical background of his thesis, he does know that it conflicts with a certain, widely-held modern notion of behavior and explanation of behavior. This opposing thesis is expressed — in the field of social sciences — e.g. by Emile Durkheim: "I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner according to which the associated individuals are grouped. Only in this way, it seems, can history become a science, and sociology exist." 13 Durkheim's unvoiced assumption is that the agent's notions are not an essential factor in his social behavior. These can be by-passed and his behavior explained "by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness"; these causes are in the social environment, "in the manner according to which the associated individuals are grouped". (The question arises, whether Durkheim does accept this theory as valid in the same way in relation to such a person as for example, a sociologist, who has become aware of those "profound causes".) In order to elucidate the contrast between the above two ideas of social science, we must examine certain viewpoints, which have been reflected in recent discussions on the concept of behavior (action). von Wright points out (1966, p. 14) that the concept of action has drawn little attention in modern philosophy. "But, if we return in time from Descartes to Thomas Aquinas, or to his master, Aristotle, the picture changes. Their thinking about action seems now uniquely modern..." I want to add to this list Hegel and Marx, both of whose thought on human action also seem so 'modern', perhaps for the reason that they have a common ancestry in the thinking of Aristotle. This interest in the concept of action may be in part a reaction against that concept of behavior which has been developed from the conceptual apparatus of certain natural sciences. Based on a notion from the field of physics, human behavior is interpreted as mere motion, which can be explained by a conceptual apparatus analogous to the explanation of the movements of inanimate matter. One culmination of this endeavor is the movement of behaviorism, whose ideal it has been to reduce human activity to 'colorless motions'. (Already the term 'behavior' in the place of 'action' often reflects the tendency to interpret human activity in the manner of the natural sciences.) Side 32 Charles Taylor, whose study, Explanation of Behavior (1964), analyzes behaviorist concepts and theories, presents interesting comments on the consequences which follow when these are applied. The talk about freedom, choice, and responsibility loses its meaning, and thus collapses the foundation of the whole modern social structure, which is built upon these concepts.14 A comment about the notion of planning can be added here. According to a certain popular conception, the behaviorist study of man and society, which explains human behavior solely in terms of causal 'natural phenomena', then only makes possible efficient and rational social planning. This conception seems to be basedon an error in thinking. The idea that human activity is guided by concious (intentional) planning conflicts with consistent behavioristic conceptions. (One can perhaps be saved from this conflict through the aid of a 'practical compromise' by dividing society into two castes: on the one hand, there is a purposely acting group of planners, on the other, the causally behaving mass for whom plans are made. The idea of 'social engineering' which belongs to the belief that man finally is gaining the same control over human behavior that he has over natural phenomena, seems to be based unconsciously on two different concepts of human behavior. Taylor's analysis — although we cannot go into its details here — shows, however, that modern behaviorist concepts and theories cannot stand up to detailed critical examination. As to the usual claim that the behaviorial sciences are in their infancy, Taylor remarks that "it begs the question. It may be that these theories are in their 'infancy' precisely because there is a fatal obstacle to their growing up, viz., that they are incorrect. The 'Galilean spirit' has been around in psychology for quite some time, and, if it hasn't produced anything very solid in experimental psychology, this may be because current approaches are wrong." At this time, according to Ta.ylor, there are grounds for the 'rational belief that animate organisms exhibite characteristics which can only be understood through concepts of intention and purpose. (Taylor, 1965, pp. 272—273) ... https://tidsskrift.dk/scandinavian_political_studies/article/view/32014/29479 3 Jurgen Habermas- Stanford Encyclopedia: Habermas's interest in the political subsequently led him to a series of philosophical studies and critical-social analyses that eventually appeared in English in his Toward a Rational Society (1970) and Theory and Practice (1973b). Whereas the latter consists primarily of reflections on the history of philosophy, the former represents an attempt to apply his emerging theory of rationality to the critical analysis of contemporary society, in particular the student protest movement and its institutional target, the authoritarian and technocratic structures that held sway in higher education and politics. 4- Christian List: 2016, Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontologicalChristian List∗LSEMarch-April 2016 Abstract: Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels ofexplanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studyinglevels. I give a general definition of asystem of levelsand discuss several appli-cations, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others referto ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it tobear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with afundamental level at the bottom? And what does the answer to this question implyfor physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains beviewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on therelationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena?1 Introduction: Scientists as well as philosophers frequently employ notions such aslevels of description,levels of explanation, andontological levels. Although it is widely held – though by nomeans universally accepted – that everything in the world is the product of fundamentalphysical processes, it is also widely recognized that, for many scientific purposes, the rightlevel of description or explanation is not the fundamental physical one, but a “higher”level, which abstracts away from microphysical details.1Chemistry, biology, geology, andmeteorology would all get bogged down with an informational or computational overloadif they tried to explain the phenomena in their domains by modelling the behaviour ofevery elementary particle, instead of invoking “higher-level” properties and regularities.For instance, it would be a hopeless task to try to understand a biological organism oran ecosystem at the level of the billions of elementary particles of which it is composed,rather than at the macroscopic level of its biological functioning.Similarly, cognitive scientists tend to assume that human psychology is better un-derstood at the level of the mind (the cognitive-psychological level) than at the levelof the brain (the neuro-physiological level).2This parallels the observation that it ismuch easier to understand the workings of a word-processing package such as MicrosoftWord at the software level than at the hardware level, where astronomical numbers ofelectrons flow through microchips.Finally, for many social-scientific purposes, the right level of description is not the“micro”-level of individuals, but a social level, involving “macro”-variables.3Despite thepopularity of methodological individualism – the view that social phenomena should beexplained at the level of individuals – macro-economists and political scientists wouldhave a hard time modelling the economy or the dynamics of political systems if they ried to represent the behaviour of every single market participant or every single citizen.Given the ubiquity of higher-level descriptions in science, some philosophers askwhether the world itself might be “stratified into levels”, where different levels are or-ganized hierarchically, perhaps with a fundamental level at the bottom.4The levels inquestion, then, are not justlevels of descriptionorexplanation, butlevels of realityorontological levels. On one view, different descriptive or explanatory levels correspond todifferent ontological levels: they are “epistemic markers” of something “ontic”.How should we think about levels? Are notions such aslevels of description,levelsof explanation, orontological levelsmere metaphors, as is sometimes suggested, or canwe explicate them precisely? The aim of this paper is to present a general framework forstudying levels, whether interpreted epistemically or ontically. I introduce an abstractdefinition of asystem of levelsand discuss a number of applications, some of whichcan be interpreted as capturing descriptive or explanatory levels while others can beinterpreted as capturing ontological levels. One of these applications captures the idea that a level of description may be a marker of an ontological level. The applications buildon some recent discussions of levels in the literature; the underlying abstract definitionis inspired by category theory.5I will illustrate the usefulness of the proposed framework by bringing it to bearon some familiar philosophical questions: are levels linearly ordered, and is there afundamental level?6And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism,the thesis that everything supervenes on (i.e., is determined by) the physical? Arethere emergent higher-level properties that are not accompanied by matching lower-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions always reducible to lower-level ones? Canwe represent the relationship between normative and non-normative domains as oneinvolving levels? And might a levelled framework shed some light on the relationshipbetween third-personal and first-personal levels, especially on the (often claimed) failureof the first-personal to supervene on the third-personal?7My aim is not to give conclusiveanswers to these questions. It would be preposterous to try to do so within the scope ofa single paper. My aim is rather to illustrate how the proposed framework allows us toframe some of the issues in a helpful way. (1See, among many others, Fodor (1974), Owens (1989), and Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).2For a classic discussion, see Putnam (1967). On levels in cognitive science, see also Bechtel (1994).3See, e.g., Kincaid (1986), Sawyer (2002, 2003), List and Pettit (2011), and List and Spiekermann (2013).4For a defence of the stratified picture, see Schaffer (2003). The quote (de-italicized) is from p. 498.) http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12040/1/Levels.pdf